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I. INTRODUCTION
In the six decades since the Supreme Court decided International
Shoe Co. v. Washington', the seminal analysis of the scope of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, courts have struggled to apply
t Associate Professor of Law, Charleston School of Law. I wish to thank Logan Rollins and
Walker Humphrey for their valuable research assistance. I would also like to thank Professors
Robert Mensel and Sheila Scheuerman for their very helpful comments on an earlier version of
this article.
1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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its meaning to varying fact patterns and causes of action. That struggle
has only intensified as modem internet contacts replace the more famil-
iar physical ties. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that-except in cer-
tain well-defined instances-the existence of specific personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in state or federal court is
impossible to predict. This means that in almost every case against a
nonresident, a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is
likely to be made. That motion will likely provoke a request for jurisdic-
tional discovery and result in a small-scale litigation of its own before
the merits of the case are ever addressed. It is an invitation to a waste of
judicial and party resources.
It is time for the states to take to heart the Supreme Court's descrip-
tion of due process as a reflection not only of the limitations on states'
power, but of state sovereignty, and of states' legitimate interests in
hearing certain disputes. To that end, states should alter their long-arm
practice to assert personal jurisdiction only in well-defined circum-
stances that reflect meaningful connections with the state, rather than
reaching the limits of due process. The resulting harm to prospective
plaintiffs who may not be able to sue in the forum of their choice is a
reasonable price to pay for increased certainty, decreased costs, and a
freeing-up of the courts' resources.
This article describes the current uncertainty surrounding personal-
jurisdiction jurisprudence and how that uncertainty has been exacerbated
by its extension to internet contacts. It advocates that states shorten their
long-arm statutes to bring more certainty to the area of personal-jurisdic-
tion jurisprudence as well as to strengthen the argument for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction pursuant to those statutes as an expression of
state sovereignty. And it proposes a model short-arm statute that exer-
cises personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in the context of traditional
state interests while defining the application of those activities within
the internet context.
II. PREINTERNET PERSONAL-JURISDICTION LAW: A Focus ON
STATES' LEGITIMATE INTERESTS
Since the straightforward analysis of Pennoyer v. Neff gave way
"inevitabl[y"] 3 to increased assertions of personal jurisdiction by states
over nonresident defendants, the line between constitutional and uncon-
2. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
3. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[A]s the years
have passed the constantly increasing ease and rapidity of communication and the tremendous
growth of interstate business activity have led to a steady and inevitable relaxation of the strict
limits on state jurisdiction announced in [Pennoyer].").
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stitutional assertions of jurisdiction has been elusive. A close examina-
tion of Supreme Court precedent reveals an abiding concern for the
sovereignty4 of the states, as well as a view of personal jurisdiction over
nonresidents as equivalent to a "quid pro quo" between the forum states
and those defendants. 5 In addition, the Court has repeatedly invited the
states to make policy decisions as to their jurisdictional reach-an invi-
tation the states should now accept-particularly in the internet context.
A. Pennoyer v. Neff.- States' Sovereign Territory
In the seminal case of Pennoyer v. Neff,6 the Court considered the
validity of an Oregon default judgment entered against a nonresident
who was not personally served and did not appear, but who owned prop-
erty in the state by the time the judgment was sought to be enforced.7
The Court expressed the concept of personal jurisdiction in terms of
physical territory:
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territo-
rial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exer-
cise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other
forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of
power, and be resisted as mere abuse. 8
The Court stressed the exclusivity of this view of states' sovereign
territory9 but recognized that an individual state's exercise of jurisdic-
tion over its own residents and property will inevitably affect nonresi-
dents and property in other states."0 Thus the Court first recognized the
concept-to be greatly expanded later-that states have a legitimate
right to exercise control over nonresidents and their property to the
extent necessary to protect the states' own residents and property. " The
Court also recognized that nonresidents will in some instances be
deemed to have accepted the jurisdiction of the state in advance, by
becoming a partner or other member of an association, or by virtue of
entering into a contract.' 2
4. In using the term "sovereignty," I refer generally to the states' rights to assert authority
over persons and property within their territory as well as to the more modem concept of states'
rights to assert authority over disputes having effects in the state or disputes arising from a nexus
with the state.
5. See infra pp. 5-11.
6. 95 U.S. at 721-22.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 720.
9. Id. at 722 ("[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons
and property within its territory.").
10. Id. at 723.
11. Jurisdiction over a nonresident found within the forum state's territory was never
questioned. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
12. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735.
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The territorial view of states' jurisdiction was unable to withstand
the practical implications of changes in society and technological
advances that led to increased movement and communication of people
among the many states.' 3 Indeed, courts quickly began fashioning
exceptions to Pennoyer's rigid formulation.' 4 Between 1877 and 1945,
the year the Supreme Court next issued a significant personal-jurisdic-
tion decision, the automobile replaced the horse and buggy, telephones
replaced telegraphs, and the modem railroad-not to mention the advent
of airplane travel-shortened distances across the country.' 5 With the
advent of mass communication and interstate commerce, personal-juris-
diction jurisprudence transitioned from an examination of territorial con-
tacts to an analysis of other proxies for physical presence. As the
jurisprudence evolved, the courts developed context-based applications
of the traditional constitutional test for personal jurisdiction and
expanded their analysis of the application of personal jurisdiction to cor-
porations. However, underlying this jurisprudence is the idea of giving
deference to states' expressions of their own interests in exacting juris-
prudential obligations based on certain in-state activities.
B. International Shoe: Jurisdiction as Quid Pro Quo
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,'6 the Court considered the
validity of the state of Washington's exercise of jurisdiction over a Mis-
souri-based corporation in an action to recover taxes arising out of the
corporation's employment of shoe salesmen in Washington.' 7 These
employees solicited orders within Washington, resulting in a substantial
volume of sales in the state.' 8 In an oft-quoted passage, the Court both
13. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 202 (1977) ("The advent of automobiles, with the
concomitant increase in the incidence of individuals causing injury in States where they were not
subject to in personam actions under Pennoyer, required further moderation of the territorial limits
on jurisdictional power.").
14. See id. at 201-02 (discussing "presence" of foreign corporations by doing business in the
forum); Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511, 515-16 (D.C. Cir. 1943) (discussing the
"tradition" of courts exercising jurisdiction over foreign corporations based on "doing business,"
including a "regular course of solicitation" in addition to other business activities); Christopher D.
Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of A Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome
Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 769, 799-804 (1995) (discussing
evolving "solicitation plus" rule).
15. See Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 573
(1958) ("The rapid development of transportation and communication in this country demanded a
revision of [the principles expressed in Pennoyer,] . . . which were appropriate for the age of the
'horse and buggy' or even for the age of the 'iron horse' [but] could not serve the era of the
airplane, the radio, and the telephone.").
16. 326 U.S. 310, 311 (1945).
17. Id. at 311, 313.
18. Id. at 313-14.
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noted the change that had taken place since Pennoyer and set forth a
new formulation for determining personal jurisdiction:
Now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if
he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions offair play and substantial justice ". 9
In the context of a corporation, "presence" means "those activities of the
corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be suffi-
cient to satisfy the demands of due process. '2
In describing those "contacts" necessary to subject a defendant to
personal jurisdiction, the Court noted the importance of considering the
reasonableness "in the context of our federal system of government" of
requiring a defendant to defend itself in a particular forum2 1 and the
"fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of
the due process clause to insure."22 In addition to this consideration of
the relationship among the states is the consideration of the relationship
between the defendant and the forum state, expressed as a logical
exchange:23 "To the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection
of the laws of that state"24 and therefore must be called to answer for
harms caused by those activities in the state.
In stressing the importance of "our federal system of government"
and the "fair and orderly administration of the laws," the Court cited
Judge Learned Hand's decision in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc.
There, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that New York lacked
personal jurisdiction over a Massachusetts corporation that had hired the
plaintiffs to purchase stock for it in New York but had failed to pay for
19. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 316-17.
21. Id. at 317.
22. Id. at 319.
23. Professor Stein states that under International Shoe's "exchange rationale," '[mlinimum
contacts ... are evidence of a deal." Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism
in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 700 (1987) [hereinafter Styles of
Argument].
24. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). Other factors for consideration
in applying the minimum contacts test include an "estimate of the conveniences" entailed in
defending itself away from its home base; the extent, volume, and pervasiveness of the
defendant's contacts in the forum-"continuous and systematic" on one end of the spectrum,
versus a "casual presence" on the other; and the "nature and quality" of some acts or the
"circumstances of their commission,"-meaning that some contacts are, by themselves,
significant enough to confer jurisdiction.
25. Id. at 17-19. (citing 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930)).
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those services. Hand's description of the relationship required between
the defendant and the forum served as a model for later Supreme Court
jurisprudence:
The theory of personal jurisdiction in an action in personam is, ordi-
narily at any rate, derived from the power over the defendant, conse-
quent upon his presence within the state of the forum. . . .As to
jurisdiction, the express consent of a corporation to be sued else-
where avoided its territorial limitations . . ., and . . .this has been
extended to cases where the corporate activities within the foreign
state are such as empower that state to exact such a consent.
26
Here, too, can be found the seeds of the Court's description in Interna-
tional Shoe of the continuum of contacts delineating general from spe-
cific from no jurisdiction:
It might indeed be argued that [a corporation] must stand suit upon
any controversy arising out of a legal transaction entered into where
the suit was brought, but that would impose upon it too severe a bur-
den. On the other hand, it is not plain that it ought not, upon proper
notice, to defend suits arising out of foreign transactions, if it con-
ducts a continuous business in the state of the forum.... But a single
transaction is certainly not enough, whether a substantial business
subjects the corporation to jurisdiction generally, or only as to local
transactions. There must be some continuous dealings in the state of
the forum; enough to demand a trial away from its home.
This last appears to us to be really the controlling consideration,
expressed shortly by the word "presence," but involving an estimate
of the inconveniences which would result from requiring it to defend,
where it has been sued. We are to inquire whether the extent and
continuity of what it has done in the state in question makes it reason-
able to bring it before one of its courts.
27
In a statement that is remarkable for its prescience, the court concluded,
"It is quite impossible to establish any rule from the decided cases; we
must step from tuft to tuft across the morass. '"28
Other decisions relied upon by the Court in International Shoe refer
to the obligation of a corporation to submit to jurisdiction in a state
26. Hutchinson, 45 F.2d at 140-41 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
27. Id. at 141 (internal citations omitted). In addition, the Court of Appeals set forth specific
actions that would or would not likely subject a corporation to personal jurisdiction in a foreign
forum-actions that are relevant to this day both to personal jurisdiction generally and to the
drafting of a state's long-arm statute: (1) "the maintenance of a regular agency for the solicitation
of business" will give rise to jurisdiction, particularly where "the business [is] continuous and
substantial;" (2) "[p]urchases, though carried on regularly, are not enough, nor are [(3)] the
activities of subsidiary corporations, or [(4)] of connecting carriers." Finally, [(5)] "[t]he
maintenance of an office" may be enough when accompanied by "continuous negotiation" and the
ability to settle claims. Id. at 141-42. (internal citations omitted).
28. Id. at 142.
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based on an exchange rationale, taking into consideration states' views
of their own jurisprudential priorities. In Lafayette Insurance Co. v.
French, the Court found that Ohio could validly exercise personal juris-
diction over an Indiana insurance company where an Ohio statute
required the company to consent to such jurisdiction as a condition of
doing business in the state, and where the company had an agent in the
state and had entered into the policy at issue in the state of Ohio.29 The
Court found such jurisdiction to be reasonable:
[W]hen this corporation sent its agent into Ohio, with authority to
make contracts of insurance there, the corporation must be taken to
assent to the condition upon which alone such business could be there
transacted by them; that condition being, that an agent, to make con-
tracts, should also be the agent of the corporation to receive service
of process in suits on such contract. ' 30
Similarly, in St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Alexander,3"
the Court upheld personal jurisdiction over a Texas railway company in
New York where the defendant was allegedly negligent in shipping
goods from Texas to New York and the joint freight agent present in
New York negotiated and corresponded about the claim, attempting
settlement:
This court has decided each case of this character upon the facts
brought before it and has laid down no all-embracing rule by which it
may be determined what constitutes the doing of business by a for-
eign corporation in such manner as to subject it to a given jurisdic-
tion. In a general way it may be said that the business must be such in
character and extent as to warrant the inference that the corporation
has subjected itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in
which it is served, and in which it is bound to appear when a proper
agent has been served with process.3"
And in International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky,33 a
company that had previously done business in Kentucky, but had since
revoked the agency of its Kentucky agent and restricted the authority of
its agents to taking orders from Kentucky to be approved outside the
state was nonetheless found to be doing business in Kentucky: Here was
a continuous course of business in the solicitation of orders which were
sent to another state and in response to which the machines of the Har-
29. 59 U.S. 404, 406, 408 (1855).
30. Id. at 408. Prior to International Shoe, many courts justified jurisdiction over corporations
based on a consent rather than a contacts model but, as the Court later acknowledges, the notion of
consent was at best a fiction. 326 U.S. at 318. The important point is the fairness of extracting
obligations in exchange for benefits.
31. 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
32. Id. at 227 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
33. 234 U.S. 579, 582-85 (1914).
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vester Company were delivered within the State of Kentucky."34 "Such
corporations [that engage in a continuous course of shipments into a
state] are within the State, receiving the protection of its laws, and may,
and often do, have large properties located within the State. 35
Individuals, too, are subject to the reciprocal duties imposed on
them by virtue of receiving the benefits and protection of the state. The
Court in International Shoe borrowed its reference to "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice ' 36 from Milliken v. Meyer,37
where the Court upheld Wyoming's exercise of jurisdiction over one of
its own domiciliaries who was served outside the state:
The state which accords [a citizen] privileges and affords protection
to him and his property by virtue of his domicile may also exact
reciprocal duties. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence within the
state, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws, are
inseparable from the various incidences of state citizenship. The
responsibilities of that citizenship arise out of the relationship to the
state which domicile creates.38
International Shoe's citations to Hess v. Pawloski39 and Young v.
Masci4 ° reflect the idea that nonresident individuals too are subject to
such "reciprocal duties" when they conduct certain activities in the state.
Thus the cases upon which the Court relied in setting out the mini-
mum contacts test in International Shoe reveal the importance of the
relationship between the state and the defendant in determining the con-
stitutionality of states' assertions of personal jurisdiction and highlight
34. Id. at 585.
35. Id. at 588. See also Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 621 (1899)
("Statutes [exacting obligations from corporations in exchange for doing business in the state]
reflect and execute the general policy of the State upon matters of public interest, and each
subsequent legislature has equal power to legislate upon the same subject."); St. Clair v. Cox, 106
U.S. 350, 355 (1882) ("[Wlhen a foreign corporation sent its officers and agents into other States
and opened offices, and carried on its business there, it was, in effect, as much represented by
them there as in the State of its creation. As it was protected by the laws of those States, allowed
to carry on its business within their borders, and to sue in their courts, it seemed only fight that it
should be held responsible in those courts to obligations and liabilities there incurred.").
36. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
37. 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
38. Id. at 463-64 (internal citations omitted).
39. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927)
(upholding a Massachusetts statute providing for service upon the secretary of state in an action
against a nonresident who operates a motor vehicle in the state, in an action arising from that
operation of the motor vehicle)).
40. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (citing Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 258 (1933)). In Young,
the Court upheld New York's application of a statute making a nonresident automobile owner
liable for the negligence of the automobile's operator: "A person who sets in motion in one State
the means by which injury is inflicted in another may, consistently with the due process clause, be
made liable for that injury whether the means employed be a responsible agent or an irresponsible
instrument." Young, 289 U.S. at 258.
[Vol. 64:133
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that the states themselves have the ability to define that relationship
within the bounds of the Constitution.4 t Unfortunately, International
Shoe has given the lower courts very little else in terms of a clear stan-
dard for application to questions of personal jurisdiction.42
C. Post-International Shoe: The Application to Contexts
The breadth of International Shoe's rule is both its blessing and its
curse. The rule encompasses any context in which litigation may arise
and is flexible enough to withstand changes in technology, commerce
and the law in general.43 But the rule's breadth gives little guidance for
particular cases. The Supreme Court has since clarified the application
of the minimum contacts test in specific contexts-but uncertainty
remains."
1. CONTRACTS: STATES' SUBSTANTIAL INTERESTS AND
CONFERRAL OF BENEFITS
The contracts context represents a comparatively straightforward
application of the minimum contacts standard where courts analyze the
41. As scholars have recognized, the Court has vacillated over the prominence it has given to
state sovereignty versus due process as the basis for jurisdictional doctrine. Compare World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980) ("The concept of minimum contacts
... acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed
on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.") with Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) ("The requirement that a court have
personal jurisdiction ... represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty,
but as a matter of individual liberty."); see also Stein, Styles of Argument, supra note 23, at 689;
A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617,
637-41 (2006) [hereinafter Jurisdiction to Adjudicate]; Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Liberty,
Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REv. 567, 568-69 (2007).
42. See Kurland, supra note 15, at 591 ("If the International Shoe case was the beginning of a
new formulation of doctrine for personal jurisdiction, it contains only a statement of policy when
'what are needed are rules of a fairly definite character .... ') (citation omitted); Spencer,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, supra note 41, at 619 ("The complexity and lack of fundamental
soundness characteristic of contemporary doctrine has resulted in a hopeless unpredictability that
fosters regular jurisdictional challenges, turning what should be a 'simple threshold question' into
one of the more vigorously litigated issues between parties.") (footnote omitted); Stein, Styles of
Argument, supra note 23, at 699 ("If, therefore, International Shoe's triumph was its recognition
that the regulatory interest of the state sometimes justified assertions of extraterritorial
jurisdiction, then its failure was the absence of any attempt to articulate those extraterritorial
boundaries.").
43. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional
Principles to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 104-08 (2006)
(hereinafter, Jurisdiction and the Internet) (arguing that International Shoe should apply to
internet cases and is capable of being applied to them).
44. Some would argue that multiple context-specific tests themselves create additional
ambiguity. See C. Douglas Floyd and Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of
Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and
Effects, 81 IND. L. J. 601, 614 (2006).
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relationship between the contract at issue and the forum state. At one
end of the spectrum, a single contract may suffice for jurisdictional pur-
poses where the nature of the contract is one that the state has a substan-
tial interest in regulating, or the subject matter of the contract reflects
substantial benefits from the connection with that state.45
In McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. ,46 the Court analyzed
the International Shoe standard in the context of an insurance contract
solicited by the defendant in the California forum.47 The decedent, a
resident of California, had paid premiums to the insurance company for
six years until his death.48 The Court upheld personal jurisdiction over
the insurance company even though that contract was the single contact
between the defendant and the forum, finding it "sufficient for purposes
of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substan-
tial connection with that State. '49 The Court emphasized the importance
to California of permitting jurisdiction in this context: "It cannot be
denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims."50 A single contract between the defendant and a resident of the
forum is therefore sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction where the
defendant has solicited business in the forum and where the nature of the
contract-insurance-is one in which the state has a recognized and
substantial interest.51
In cases in which the subject matter of the contract is not one so
traditionally regulated by the state, the Court's analysis in Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz52 instructs courts to look at the purposefulness of the
defendant's actions towards the forum state, including "prior negotia-
tions and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the
contract and the parties' actual course of dealing. ' 53 Rejecting any "tal-
ismanic jurisdictional formulas," the Court advised that each case must
be viewed on its own unique facts 4.5 The contract at issue in Burger
King between the plaintiff corporation and the defendant franchisor had
45. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
46. Id. at 221-24.
47. Id. at 221.
48. Id. at 221-22, 223-24.
49. Id. at 223.
50. Id.
51. See also Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647-48 (1950) (according
"'great weight' to the 'consequences' of the contractual obligations in the state where the insured
reside[s] and the 'degree of interest' that state [has] in seeing that those obligations [are] faithfully
carried out") (quoting Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 US. 313 (1943) [sic]).
52. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
53. Id. at 479.
54. Id. at 485-86.
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a substantial connection with the Florida forum. The defendant agreed to
a twenty-year relationship with an enterprise based primarily in Florida
and anticipated long-term benefits resulting from affiliation with a
nationally recognized corporation.55 Beyond that, the contract provided
for the application of Florida law.56 As in McGee, that single contract
was found sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.57
In contrast, the Court found insufficient as a basis for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction the contractual relationship between a trustee
and the state where the trust was probated in Hanson v. Denckla.58
There, the Court considered whether Florida could constitutionally exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee. The Court described
the issue as "the absence of those 'affiliating circumstances' without
which the courts of a State may not enter a judgment imposing obliga-
tions on persons ... or affecting interests in property. . .. "I'
As in its other decisions, the Court referred to states' authority vis-
a-vis that of other states: "[T]he in rem jurisdiction of a state court is
limited by the extent of its power and by the coordinate authority of
sister States."6° Unlike in McGee, the defendant here did not transact or
solicit business in Florida, and the cause of action did not "arise[ ] out of
an act done or transaction consummated in the forum State. 61
In addition, the Court focused on the failure of the trustee to have
exercised a privilege in Florida that then gave rise to an obligation that it
should defend against in Florida:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a
nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with
the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality
and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.62
Purposeful availment is closely related to the role of foreseeability,
the importance of which was stressed by the Court in World-Wide Volk-
swagen Corp. v. Woodson:
55. Id. at 464, 467, 485.
56. Id. at 464, 467, 481.
57. Id. at 487.
58. 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958).
59. Id. at 245-46.
60. Id. at 246; see also id. at 251 ("[R]estrictions [on the personal jurisdiction of the state
courts] are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.").
61. Id. at 251.
62. Id. at 253 (emphasis added); see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 298 (1980) (quoting Hanson).
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[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State.
Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there. The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the "orderly
administration of the laws," gives a degree of predictability to the
legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their pri-
mary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that con-
duct will and will not render them liable to suit.63
Importantly, the Court distinguished McGee on the basis that "there
the State had enacted special legislation . . . to exercise what McGee
called its 'manifest interest' in providing effective redress for citizens
who had been injured by nonresidents engaged in an activity that the
State treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation."'  In con-
trast, the trust agreement in Hanson was entered into in Delaware, its
connection with the Florida forum was based on the "unilateral activity"
of the settlor in moving to Florida, and Florida had not expressed a spe-
cial interest in regulating the subject matter of the agreement.65 Other
than in insurance and "long-term relationship" contexts, or when the
state otherwise expresses special interest in exercising jurisdiction in
that circumstance, the determinants of a contract's "substantial connec-
tion" with the state remain uncertain.66
2. STREAM OF COMMERCE: FORESEEABILITY AND PURPOSEFUL
AVAILMENT IN PRODUCT PLACEMENT
In the stream of commerce context, the Court appeared to set forth
a specific rule to guide the lower courts: "The forum State does not
exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal
jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream
of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by con-
63. 444 U.S. at 297. (citations omitted). While a blanket allowance of all jurisdiction the
Constitution allows does not provide any meaningful foreseeability for potential defendants in a
forum state's courts, specific statements of the conduct that will result in such jurisdiction does. In
his dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice Brennan opined that the Court placed too little
emphasis on Oklahoma's interest in exercising jurisdiction over litigation involving plaintiffs
injured and hospitalized there, noting that "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in enforcing its
laws designed to keep its highway system safe." 444 U.S. at 305, As in Shaffer, infra text p. 22, it
is likely that if Oklahoma's long-arm statute had expressed such an interest in asserting
jurisdiction in this context, the outcome would have been different.
64. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958).
65. Id. at 252-53.
66. See Cameron & Johnson, supra note 14, at 835 (noting that Burger King's fact-specific
holding "spawned the next generation of litigation in the lower courts concerning the exercise of
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in contract disputes"); Floyd & Baradaran-Robison,
supra note 44, at 621 (2006) (noting that Burger King's test "has proved less than self-defining"
and has been articulated in a "plethora of differing formulations" by lower courts).
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sumers in the forum State."67 In World-Wide Volkswagen, this meant
that jurisdiction was not appropriate over the New York dealer and dis-
tributor of an automobile that was purchased in New York and then
driven to Oklahoma, where the accident occurred.6 8 In denying personal
jurisdiction based on this isolated sale, the Court noted the two related
functions of the minimum contacts requirement:
It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant
or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.6 9
This "status as coequal sovereigns" means that "the States retain
many essential attributes of sovereignty, including, in particular, the sov-
ereign power to try causes in their courts" and a concomitant limitation
on the sovereignty of other states.70
The Court then obfuscated the standard for the stream of commerce
application of the minimum contacts test in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v.
Superior Court.7 1 The Court in Asahi examined the issue of exercising
personal jurisdiction over "up-stream" component manufacturers who
might well be held to have foreseen that their products-once made part
of a motorcycle-would be "purchased by consumers in the forum
State."7 2 Here, all but one member of the Court found that International
Shoe's fairness prong, previously given little virility, would not allow
jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers where the litigation itself had
little connection to the forum.73 The weighing of the "burden on the
defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff's interest in
obtaining relief,"74 in addition to "'the interstate judicial system's inter-
est in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substan-
tive social policies'"7 resulted in the finding that-apart from the exis-
tence of minimum contacts-the exercise of jurisdiction in this case
would be "unreasonable and unfair." 76
67. World-WideVolkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980).
68. Id. at 287, 299.
69. Id. at 292.
70. Id. at 293.
71. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
72. Id. at 105, 112; see also World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298. Four members of the
Asahi Court would require not only foreseeability but additional conduct "purposefully directed
toward the forum State." Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. (emphasis omitted).
73. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113-16. Justice Scalia did not join this section of the Court's opinion.
Id. at 105.
74. Id. at 113.
75. Id. (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 116.
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The Court split as to whether the minimum contacts standard itself
was met. Four justices77 found the "substantial connection" required by
the Court's precedents to be lacking:
The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without
more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the
forum State. Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an
intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State .... But a
defendant's awareness that the stream of commerce may or will
sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act
of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully
directed toward the forum State.78
Four other justices would have found purposeful availment on the facts
of Asahi.79
Thus the application of the International Shoe standard in the
stream of commerce context-particularly whether foreseeability alone
is sufficient-remains unclear.8° And contacts arising in between the
far-upstream or intensely local downstream are uncertain.8'
3. INTENTIONAL TORTS: TARGETED ACTION
Finally, the Court has noted factors to consider when applying the
International Shoe test to the intentional tort context. In Calder v. Jones,
a well-known actress sued the National Inquirer for libel arising from an
article impugning her character and ability to fulfill her professional
obligations. 8' The plaintiff lived in California, and her career was cen-
tered there.83 The magazine was based in Florida, although the state with
its largest circulation was California.84 In contrast with the approach in
previous personal jurisdiction settings, the Court in Calder focused on
the intentional targeting of the defendant's conduct at the forum state
and its foreseeable effects in that state:
77. The plurality included Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Powell and Scalia. Id. at 105.
78. Id. at 112.
79. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun. Id.
80. See Cameron & Johnson, supra note 14, at 833 ("[U]ncertainty in the most commonplace
situations has increased, rather than decreased, as International Shoe has matured. Most notably,
the inability of a majority of the Court in Asahi and Burnham v. Superior Court to agree on the
proper analysis applicable to run-of-the-mill fact situations has contributed to this development.").
81. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction:
From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 19, 77 (1990) (stating that
Asahi "muddied the law of personal jurisdiction even further at a time when lower courts and
parties were having an extremely difficult time trying to 'apply' the Court's maddeningly unstable
constitutional 'test' for personal jurisdiction.").
82. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984).
83. Id. at 785.
84. Id.
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[The plaintiff's] television career was centered in California ...
[T]he brunt of the harm, in terms both of [plaintiffs] emotional dis-
tress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in
California. In sum, California is the focal point both of the story and
of the harm suffered.8 5
The publishing of the article was not analogous to "mere untargeted
negligence" implicated by the placement of a product in the stream of
commerce but rather involved intentional and tortious actions "expressly
aimed at California. "86
Like the other context-specific formulations, Calder has engen-
dered confusion and controversy. Courts disagree as to whether Calder
requires that the targeted audience-in addition to or instead of the
targeted plaintiff-be in the forum state.87 In addition, some courts
apply the effects test, uniquely suited to intentional acts, to other argua-
bly inapplicable causes of action.88
4. IMPORTANCE IN ALL CONTEXTS OF THE STATE'S
EXPRESSION OF ITS INTERESTS
As in its pre-International Shoe decisions,89 the Court's post-Inter-
national Shoe opinions reflect a deference to the states' expression of
their own interests. In addition to showing deference in the insurance
context, 90 the Court has emphasized that a state has a legitimate interest
in providing means to close trusts established under state law, 9' and it
85. Id. at 788-89.
86. Id. at 789 (distinguishing World-Wide Volkswagen and other cases).
87. Compare Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 476 (5th Cir. 2002) with Young v. New Haven
Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 258-59 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding jurisdiction inappropriate because the
intended audience for the newspaper's website was readers in the state where the newspaper is
physically located, not readers in the state where the target of the alleged false statements resided);
and Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet, supra note 43, at 101-03 (criticizing courts'
application of Calder in internet context to focus on the audience for the publication rather than
the plaintiff target).
88. See Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 44, at 612 ("Post-Calder decisions applying
the effects test in cases involving intentional personal torts, business torts, and torts committed by
means of the Internet have evidenced considerable confusion over the kind of intent that is
relevant in applying the Calder test."); Denis T. Rice & Julia Gladstone, An Assessment of the
Effects Test in Determining Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 58 Bus. LAW. 601, 629 (2003)
("[Tihe utility of the effects test may be greater with certain causes of action than with others.").
89. See supra text pp. 2-4.
90. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950) (holding that Virginia could
subject a Nebraska insurance company to the jurisdiction of its courts pursuant to a Virginia
statute); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 221, 224 (1957) (deferring to California's
expression of its interests via the enactment of a California statute subjecting foreign corporations
to suits in California based on their drafting of insurance contracts with California residents).
91. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("[T]he interest of
each state in providing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and are
administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish
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has a legitimate interest in redressing injuries that occur within its bor-
ders.92 Importantly, in finding such a legitimate interest, the Court pays
special attention to legislative pronouncements of the states themselves.
In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., the Court found proper the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on false state-
ments published outside the forum state but circulated therein, that
harmed an out-of-state resident.93 The Court relied in large part upon
New Hampshire's criminal defamation statute that was not restricted to
resident victims and on New Hampshire's long-arm statute that which
had "specifically deleted ... the requirement that a tort be committed
'against a resident of New Hampshire."' 94
In contrast, the Court is less likely to find the exercise of personal
jurisdiction proper where the state has not expressed an interest in
asserting jurisdiction over the specific subject matter. In Kulko v. Supe-
rior Court of California,95 the Court rejected the argument that Califor-
nia's interest in protecting the welfare of its minor residents justified the
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident father, not-
ing that "California has not attempted to assert any particularized inter-
est in trying such cases in its courts by, e.g., enacting a special
jurisdictional statute. 96
Shaffer v. Heitner is another example of a case where the Court
found that the lack of any expressed legislative interest by the state in
exercising jurisdiction over a particular subject matter was a reason to
deny personal jurisdiction. 97 Here, the plaintiffs argued that Interna-
tional Shoe's requirement of minimum contacts between the defendant
and the forum was met where the defendants were officers and directors
of a corporation formed under the laws of the forum state.98 The plain-
tiffs emphasized Delaware's interest in supervising the management of
Delaware corporations. 99 But the Court found plaintiffs' argument to be
beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or
nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear and be heard.").
92. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 776 (1984) ("[I]t is beyond dispute that
New Hampshire has a significant interest in redressing injuries that actually occur within the
State.").
93. Id. at 773-74.
94. Id. at 777.
95. 436 U.S. 84, 84 (1978).
96. Id. at 98.
97. 433 U.S. 186, 214-15 (1977) ("If Delaware perceived its interest in securing jurisdiction
over corporate fiduciaries to be as great as [plaintiff] suggests, we would expect it to have enacted
a statute more clearly designed to protect that interest."); see also Hanson, v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958).
98. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213-14.
99. Id. at 214.
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belied by the Delaware Legislature's failure to assert that interest."0O The
Court noted that Delaware had not enacted a statute treating acceptance
of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction.101 Such a statute would have
shown that Delaware had a compelling interest in exercising jurisdiction
in this context and given the defendants reason to expect to be haled
before a Delaware court.10 2
One thing is clear from the Court's precedents: the states them-
selves have the ability to make policy judgments as to those actions that
will constitute purposeful availment. 03 As set forth in Part IV, the states
have not done so to any meaningful extent. Therefore, International
Shoe's dictates remain cloudy, and courts still must "step from tuft to
tuft across the morass""'° whenever the issue of specific't 5 personal
jurisdiction arises.' 06
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Of course, Delaware promptly passed such a statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114
(2009). Interestingly, a Delaware court recently upheld jurisdiction over a New York attorney who
transacted business in Delaware by causing the filing of certificates with the secretary of state and
providing services to Delaware corporate officers and board members, based on Delaware's
interest in ensuring that Delaware corporations and their stockholders have access to its judicial
system. See Sample v. Morgan, 935 A.2d 1046, 1047-48 (Del. Ch. 2007).
103. Professor Spencer argues for the centrality of state interest in assessing amenability to
suit. Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, supra note 41, at 645 ("[T]he minimum connection that
must exist between a nonresident defendant and the forum is one where the alleged actions of the
defendant have implicated the legitimate interests of the forum state, creating a link that makes it
fair and nonarbitrary for that state to exercise adjudicatory authority over the case against that
defendant. Where a nonresident defendant acts in such a way so as to adversely affect affairs
within a state, disputes arising therefrom are something that a state has a clear interest in
resolving; such an interest justifies jurisdiction unless there is a real injury to [the defendant's due
process interests].").
104. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930).
105. This is not to suggest that the issue of general jurisdiction is a simple one. On the
contrary, considerable confusion exists as to whether general jurisdiction jurisprudence retains
viability. Compare Burnham v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610 n.1 (1990) (questioning
whether general jurisdiction may be found outside the context of regular service of summons in
the forum upon a corporation's president acting in that capacity) with Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952) (upholding Ohio's exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation that had been carrying on "a continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general
business" in a cause of action that "did not arise in Ohio and does not relate to the corporation's
activities there"), and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-19
(1984) (analyzing the issue of general jurisdiction over the defendant, but finding its connection
with the forum insufficient).
106. Even eighteen years ago, personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence was fodder for an alarming
number of cases. See Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70 TEx.
L. REv. 1589, 1590, 1590 n. 5 (1992) (noting that "cases presenting the issue of amenability to
personal jurisdiction under [the Supreme Court's] confusing standards now make up a large share
of reported state and federal decisions," and noting a period of fourteen months in 1990 and 1991
in which 350 decisions were published dealing with the issue of personal jurisdiction). The issue
has largely become more, rather than less, complicated.
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III. THE INTERNET'S EFFECT ON PERSONAL-JURISDICTION LAW:
VIRTUAL AVAILMENT
The advent of the Internet threw a wrench into this already complex
and fact-specific system. Courts have struggled both to understand the
underlying technology and to find a way to view internet contacts
through the existing jurisprudential prism. The resulting landscape has
not been pretty.
A. Confusion About Application to the Internet
While the law of personal jurisdiction was already in a sense
unmoored from physical boundaries, the Internet's complete derogation
of any geographic border poses unique challenges for the courts.1 °7
Before the advent of the Internet, personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence had
already transitioned from focusing on physical presence' 0 8 to considera-
tions of activities in another state being directed to'0 9 or having effects
in' t0 the forum. The Internet both increases the likelihood of these out-
of-state activities having effects within the state and poses the newer
difficulty of ease of access to all states simultaneously,11' as well as a
lack of knowledge of the location of counter-parties to a transaction.' 1 2
The confusion caused by internet contacts in the personal-jurisdic-
tion setting can be divided into two somewhat overlapping categories.
First, courts have had trouble creating a coherent system for classifying
the various internet contacts a defendant might have with a state.
Whether a function of unfamiliarity with the subject matter or of simple
expediency, courts have tended to lump all kinds of internet contacts
into the same basket, even though there are significant distinctions
among communicating via e-mail," 3 internet advertising," 4 e-com-
107. See Michele N. Breen, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: "Shoehorning"
Cyberspace Into International Shoe, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 763, 774 (1998).
108. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
109. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
110. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
11I. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn. 1996) ("In the
present case, Instruction has directed its advertising activities via the Internet and its toll-free
number toward not only the state of Connecticut, but to all states.").
112. But see Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet, supra note 43, at 88 (finding "presumption
of aimlessness" to be a fiction); id. at 91-92 (noting available "jurisdiction avoidance
mechanisms").
113. See Resuscitation Techs., Inc. v. Cont'l Health Care Corp., No. IP 96-1457-C-M/S, 1997
WL 148567, at *1,*5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997) (applying Zippo analysis to contacts arising from
e-mails).
114. See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Wilkins, 142 F. Supp. 2d 703, 704, 708 (D. Md. 2001), aff'd, 293
F. Supp. 2d 707 (4th Cir. 2002) (analyzing contacts based on online advertisement under the
spectrum of passivity introduced by Zippo); Digital Control Inc. v. Boretronics Inc., 161 F. Supp.
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merce," 5 the posting of allegedly defamatory content on a website,' 1 6
and the improper use of trademarked or copyrighted material on a web-
site ' 1 7 or in a domain name." 8 But courts have treated all such internet
contacts the same rather than differentiating the claims that arise out of
that internet use from claims which are themselves unconnected to a
defendant's website. 119
Similarly, courts have attempted to apply a single derivative test to
these contexts and have largely ignored existing Supreme Court prece-
dent, rather than viewing the minimum contacts test through the tradi-
tional prism of a common law or statutory cause of action. Just as the
use of the Internet to purchase goods differs from its use to post infor-
mation, the "interactivity" of a site is more or less relevant in these
contexts. 2 0
Because the Internet transcends both personal and business spheres,
the causes of action arising out of internet contacts can, and do, vary
widely. 1 ' As discussed above, courts have developed standards for the
application of International Shoe in these different contexts to determine
if personal jurisdiction is proper. But early on, courts applying personal-
jurisdiction jurisprudence to internet contacts treated the internet context
as a species of its own.
B. Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.: Universal Jurisdiction
Inset Systems'22 was one of the first cases to analyze personal juris-
diction in an internet context. Here, the plaintiff, a Connecticut corpora-
2d 1183, 1186 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (using "web site plus" rule to analyze jurisdiction based on the
placing of online advertisements).
115. See Sports Auth. Mich., Inc. v. Justballs, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 806, 809, 812 (E.D. Mich.
2000) (considering "level of interactivity and commercial nature of the information" on
defendant's web site in analyzing jurisdiction over a defendant accused of unfair trade practices).
116. See Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 468, 470 (5th Cir. 2002); Hy Cite Corp. v.
Badbusinessbureau.com L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1161-67 (W.D. Wisc. 2004); Barrett v.
Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 726 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
117. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 448, 451-53 (3d Cir. 2003).
118. See Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2002); Caterpillar Inc. v. Miskin Scraper
Works, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 849, 853 (C.D. 111. 2003) (applying Zippo).
119. See Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can't Always Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a
Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1147, 1149 (2005).
120. See Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet, supra note 43, at 98 ("A passive Web site is as
capable of originating a contractual relationship with forum residents as is an interactive Web
site.... The level of interactivity exhibited by a Web site is of even less relevance when the claim
sounds in tort or asserts an intellectual property violation.").
121. See Daniel Steuer, The Shoe Fits and the Lighter Is Out of Gas: The Continuing Utility of
International Shoe and the Misuse and Ineffectiveness of Zippo, 74 U. COLo. L. REV. 319, 334
(2003) (finding an "explosion of Intemet-related cases" in comparing the year 2001 to years prior
to 1997).
122. Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
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tion that owned the trademark "Inset," sued the Massachusetts-based
defendant that had registered the domain name "Inset.com" for use in
advertising its own goods and services, for trademark infringement. 12 3
The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, finding first that the defendant's use of a website consti-
tuted repeated solicitation of business under Connecticut's long-arm
statute. 124
In addition, the court found that the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion satisfied due process because "the defendant has used the Internet,
as well as its toll-free number to try to conduct business within the state
of Connecticut." '125 The defendant should have reasonably anticipated
being sued in the forum because it had "directed its advertising activities
via the Internet and its toll-free number toward not only the state of
Connecticut, but to all states. 11 26 The court did not find that the site had
been accessed by Connecticut residents or had resulted in any purchases
by Connecticut residents; the potential business was itself sufficient.
The implications of Inset's reasoning were disastrous to online
businesses that would be held to do business in every forum in which the
website is accessible, whether or not the company actually did business
in those fora. 127 For that reason, most courts and commentators have
rejected Inset's broad reach 128 but have not much improved upon its
analysis.
C. The Zippo Test: A Less Expansive, but Also Less
Predictable, Position
Partially in an attempt to curb the seemingly limitless boundaries of
a court's jurisdictional power implied by Inset, courts struggled to find a
123. Id. at 162.
124. Id. at 164 (finding the existence of the website to be continuous advertisement directed
toward the 10,000 internet users in Connecticut).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 165.
127. See Dan L. Burk, Jurisdiction in a World Without Borders, I VA. J. L. & TECH. 3, $ 53
(1997), http://www.vjolt.net/voll/issue/vollart3.pdf (noting that a large number of companies
have websites).
128. See Digital Control Inc. v. Boretronics Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1186 (W.D. Wash.
2001) ("[T]he legal analysis in Inset is far from compelling."); Bunmi Awoyemi, Zippo is Dying,
Should it be Dead?: The Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction by U.S. Federal Courts Over Non-
Domiciliary Defendants in Trademark Infringement Lawsuits Arising Out of Cyberspace, 9
MARQ. INTELL. PRop. L. REV. 37, 46 (2005) (observing that Inset's "over-expansion of the
personal jurisdiction doctrine . . . makes it somewhat vulnerable to due process attacks"); but see
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1996) (relying on Inset standard to
find jurisdiction proper); Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D.
Mo.1996) (citing Inset with approval in finding jurisdiction over defendant based on allegedly
infringing website).
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new method of analyzing internet contacts. What has become the most
widely accepted test 129 originated from a district court decision in the
Western District of Pennsylvania. 30
Like Inset, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., arose
out of an internet domain name dispute. The plaintiff-a lighter manu-
facturer-brought suit against a California computer news service based
on that service's use of the "Zippo" trademark in several domain
names. 13' The defendant maintained no offices, employees, or agents in
the forum state of Pennsylvania, but approximately two percent (or
3,000) of its website subscribers were residents of the state. 132 Those
subscribers had visited the website and completed an online application
for the service. In addition, the defendant had contracted with seven
Pennsylvania Internet access providers so that Pennsylvania residents
could access its service. 133
Upon the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction, the district court devised a sliding scale test for pur-
poseful availment in the internet context:
[T]he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of com-
mercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet .... At one
end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does
business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with
residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and
repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal
jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where a
defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site
which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web
site that does little more than make information available to those
who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites
where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In
these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining
the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of
129. See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating Zippo
"has become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon the operation of an
Internet web site").
130. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). Zippo was
not actually the first court to consider a website's interactivity in determining whether personal
jurisdiction was validly based on that site. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1266
(6th Cir. 1996) (finding indicia of "interactivity" later discussed in detail in Zippo); Maritz, 947 F.
Supp. at 1333 (rejecting defendant's claim that it maintained a merely "passive website" in finding
jurisdiction appropriate).
131. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1120-21.
132. Id. at 1121.
133. Id.
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information that occurs on the Web site. 134
Zippo's test resembles the sliding scale set forth by the Supreme Court
in International Shoe. 35 The finding of an interactive site through which
a defendant is "clearly doing business over the internet" is similar to
International Shoe's finding of specific jurisdiction where a corpora-
tion's activities are "continuous and systematic" and "give rise to the
liabilities sued on."'136 Zippo's finding of a passive website is like Inter-
national Shoe's reference to "casual presence" or "single or isolated"
activities.' 37 And, as with International Shoe, the difficulty in applying
Zippo is with the "vast middle area"' 38 between these poles.
Applying its test to the facts before it, the Zippo court noted that the
defendant's website did more than merely advertise but affirmatively
conducted "electronic commerce" with Pennsylvania residents. 39 This
constituted "doing business over the internet" on the high end of the
court's proposed scale. 140 The defendant's activities were purposeful in
that it "repeatedly and consciously chose to process Pennsylvania
residents' applications" for its service.' 4 ' Therefore, the defendant was
on notice that it would be amenable to suit in Pennsylvania, and confer-
ral of personal jurisdiction was proper.14
The Zippo test has been praised'43 and criticized' 44 but never
134. Id. at 1124 (internal citations omitted).
135. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
136. Id. at 317.
137. Id.
138. Yokoyama, supra note 119, at 1166-67.
139. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125.
140. Id. at 1125-26. The court noted that the defendant's website was more than the passive
advertising at issue in Inset, and more even than the active solicitation and promotional activities
at issue in Maritz. 952 F. Supp. at 1125. The case was on par with the business conducted via the
Internet in CompuServe, where a nonresident of the forum state contracted to distribute software
via the defendant's Internet server. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1260 (6th
Cir. 1996).
141. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Richard K. Greenstein, The Action Bias in American Law: Internet Jurisdiction
and the Triumph of Zippo Dot Com, 80 TEmp. L. REv. 21, 32-33 (2007) (characterizing Zippo as
an "overwhelming triumph" due to the American propensity to assign legal duties based on active
behavior); Carlos J.R. Salvado, An Effective Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine for the Internet, 12 U.
BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 75, 103 (2003) ("The [Zippo] court produced a thoughtful opinion that
remained true to the established principles of personal jurisdiction").
144. See, e.g., Webzero, LLC v. Clicvu, Inc., No. CV-08-0504-MRP (PLAx), 2008 WL
1734702, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008) ("[T]he criticism of the Zippo rule in cases like Hy Cite
and Shamsuddin is somewhat compelling in this scenario. It is an undesirable result that a
company is subject to personal jurisdiction based on its website, where the website and the very
nature of its product do not differentiate in any way between different forums."); Awoyemi, supra
note 128, at 62 ("What the Zippo court did not foresee was how many Web sites would fall into its
negligibly useful middle classification and how often courts would misapply the test .... [Ilit may
be time for the courts to let it die."); Rachael T. Krueger, Comment, Traditional Notions of Fair
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ignored.145 Some courts follow the Zippo test either overtly 4 6 or by
applying a similar "interactivity" test.'47 Some courts have modified the
Zippo test to require something in addition to the interactivity of the
website, variously referred to as "targeting" or "direction" of activity
into the state.' 4 8
Courts have applied the Zippo test to causes of action based on
Play and Substantial Justice Lost in Cyberspace: Personal Jurisdiction and On-Line Defamatory
Statements, 51 CAmH. U. L. REv. 301, 326 (2001) ("The Internet jurisdiction rules of Zippo and its
progeny enable courts to veer off the path of fairness and foreseeability in order to accommodate
expanding litigation"); Robert M. Haskins, Jr., The Legal World Wide Web: Electronic Personal
Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation, or How to Expose Yourself to Liability Anywhere in the
World with the Press of a Button, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 451, 475 (1998) ("While the court in Zippo
takes pains to carefully reason its decision, its misanalysis of the specific jurisdiction question
leads to the wrong result").
145. According to Westlaw, Zippo has been cited in over 600 court decisions and 648 law
review articles in the twelve years since the decision.
146. The following circuits appear to follow Zippo: Fifth Circuit, see Mink v. AAAA Dev.
LLC 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) and Qassas v. Daylight Donut Flour Co., LLC, No. 4:09-
CV-0208, 2009 WL 1795004, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 24, 2009); Eighth Circuit, see Lakin v.
Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 711-12 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying Zippo test and then
examining the quality of the contacts) and Romeo Entm't Group, Inc. v. Showing Animals
Respect & Kindness, Inc., No. 8:08CV481, 2009 WL 764557, at *5 (D. Neb. Mar. 20, 2009)
("[T]he Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the Zippo analytical framework."); Ninth
Circuit, see Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding the
"common thread" among precedent across courts is principally laid out in Zippo) and Am. Auto.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Darba Enters. Inc., No. C 09-00510 SI, 2009 WL 1066506, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21,
2009) (using Zippo spectrum analysis); and Tenth Circuit, see Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard
Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying Zippo "sliding scale" analysis)
and Conlin Enter. Corp. v. Snews LLC, No. 2 07 cv 922, 2008 WL 803041, at *5-6 (D. Utah
Mar. 24, 2008) (same).
147. The Seventh Circuit requires that, to premise jurisdiction on the maintenance of a website,
there be "some level of 'interactivity' between the defendant and consumers in the forum state."
Jennings v. AC Hydraulic A/S, 383 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2004); see Morrison v. YTB Int'l, Inc.,
Nos. 08-565-GMP & 08-579-GMP, 2009 WL 2244471, at *8 (S.D. 11. June 5, 2009) (rejecting
plaintiffs claim that jurisdiction was proper where there was "simply no evidence" of an
interactive website).
148. The Third Circuit, where the district court that decided Zippo is located, requires
interactivity as well as "additional evidence that the defendant has 'purposefully availed' itself of
the privilege of engaging in activity in that state." Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d
446, 451-52 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that while defendant's website was sufficiently "interactive"
under Zippo, the interactivity of a website alone cannot lead to personal jurisdiction); see Chanel,
Inc. v. Guetae, No. 07-3309 (JAG), 2009 WL 348501, at *4-5 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2009) (finding that
the website was interactive but did not target New Jersey residents). The Fourth Circuit requires
that the defendant "direct[ ] electronic activity into the State,[ ] with the manifested intent of
engaging in business or other interactions within the State." ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv.
Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002); see also Williams v. Adver. Sex LLC, No.
1:05CV51, 2009 WL 723168, at *2 (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 17, 2009) (applying ALS Scan standard).
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negligence,' 49  breach of contract, 50  torts,15' patent infringement, 5 2
trademark infringement, 53 defamation,'54 and antitrust. 55 Some courts
find that the Calder effects test should apply instead when the claim is
based on an intentional tort,1 56 where other courts apply Zippo to such a
claim. 157 Still, other courts apply both Zippo and Calder to intentional
torts. 158 Some courts apply Zippo to the specific jurisdiction context
149. See, e.g., Edwards v. Erdey, 770 N.E.2d 672, 676, 678 (Ohio C.P. 2001) (applying Zippo
to a medical malpractice case); Quality Design & Constr., Inc. v. Tuff Coat Mfg., Inc., 939 So. 2d
429, 431, 435 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2006) (applying Zippo to contractor's claim against coating
manufacturer for damage to playground surface).
150. See Resuscitation Techs., Inc., v. Cont'l Health Care Corp., No. IP 96-1457-C-M/S, 1997
WL 148567, at *3, *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 1997); Stewart v. Hennesey, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1198,
1200, 1202-04 (D. Utah 2002).
151. Williams, 2009 WL 723168, at *1, *2 (defamation); Doe v. Ciolli, 611 F. Supp. 2d 216,
218, 221-22 (D. Conn. 2009) (discussing Zippo in the context of various tort claims); Barrett v.
Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 728, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding no personal jurisdiction
over a defendant who, after posting a comment on a discussion board of a web site and entering
into an e-mail conversation with the plaintiff, allegedly placed defamatory statements on her
website and made ninety postings in other discussion groups, encouraging those viewers to visit
her own website: "The Defendant did not participate in any on-line interactions such as the
acceptance of information from forum residents, the entrance into a contractual agreement via the
transmission of electronic mail, or the use of its Web sites to encourage contacts with forum
residents.") (internal citations omitted).
152. See, e.g., Neato, Inc. v. Great Gizmos, 3:99CV958 (AVC), 2000 WL 305949, at *1, *3
(D. Conn. Feb. 24, 2000).
153. See Am. Ass'n of Blood Banks v. Boston Paternity, LLC, No. DKC 2008-2046, 2009 WL
2366175, at *2, *8 (D. Md. July 28, 2009); 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. Memorial Eye, No. 2:08-CV-
983 TS, 2009 WL 1586654, at *1-2 (D. Utah June 4, 2009); Hershey Co. v. Pagosa Candy Co.,
No. 1:07-CV-1363, 2008 WL 1730538, at *4-5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2008).
154. See Toytrackerz LLC v. Koehler, No. 08-2297-GLR, 2009 WL 1505705, at *1, *8 (D.
Kan. May 28, 2009); Gorman v. Jacobs, 597 F. Supp. 2d 541, 543, 548 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
155. Universal Grading Serv. v. eBay, Inc., No. 08-CV-3557 (CPS), 2009 WL 2029796, at *1,
*7 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009).
156. Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding the
defendant's activities in registering the plaintiffs trademark as a domain name, and offering to
sell it to the plaintiff when asked to stop using it, were specifically directed at the plaintiff in
California, where he knew the plaintiff would suffer harm); Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d
1280, 1287-88 (11 th Cir. 2008); Toytrackerz, 2009 WL 1505705, at *11; Andy's Music, Inc. v.
Andy's Music, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1284 (S.D. Ala. 2009); see also Rice & Gladstone,
supra note 88, at 629-42 (discussing intentional torts that are typically analyzed under the Calder
test).
157. See Williams v. Adver. Sex LLC, No. 1:05CV51, 2009 WL 723168, at *5-6 (N.D. W.
Va. Mar. 17, 2009) (declining plaintiffs argument that the court should apply the effects test in a
defamation action and instead following the Fourth Circuit's version of the Zippo sliding scale
test).
158. See Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471-76 (5th Cir. 2002) (looking both at interactivity
of website on which defendant posted allegedly defamatory statement, and evaluating "the extent
of this interactivity ... with respect to Calder," finding no jurisdiction because the forum state
was not the focus of the harm); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc. 293 F.3d 707,
713-14 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting the standards are not inconsistent and applying both to find
jurisdiction in a copyright infringement suit); Family Watchdog, LLC v. Schweiss, No. I:08-CV-
642-SEB-DML, 2009 WL 276856, at *5-6 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 5, 2009) ("[T]he Zippo framework is
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only;' 59 others apply it to questions of general jurisdiction as well. 6 °
Some courts find that Zippo only applies to websites at either extreme of
its own spectrum. 6 ' Other courts refuse to apply Zippo at all, finding the
interactivity of a website to be irrelevant.'
62
The primary criticism of Zippo is that the focus on interactivity of
the website, no matter what the connection is between that site and the
cause of action, ignores the critical relationship between the forum and
the cause of action. 163 In addition, courts have been inconsistent with
not the beginning and end of internet personal jurisdiction analysis."); Nationwide Contractor
Audit Serv., Inc. v. Nat'l Compliance Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 276, 292-97 (W.D. Pa.
2008) (applying Zippo to the question of general jurisdiction and Calder to the question of specific
jurisdiction).
159. See Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 711 (8th Cir. 2003); Revell, 317 F.3d at
471; ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 714-15; Viko v. World Vision, Inc., No. 2:08-CV-221, 2009 WL
2230919, at * 12 (D. Vt. July 24, 2009); Heidle v. Prospect Reef Resort, Ltd., 364 F. Supp. 2d 312,
318 n.18 (W.D.N.Y. 2005); Smith v. Basin Park Hotel, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1233 (N.D.
Okla. 2001). But see Molnlycke Health Care v. Dumex Med. Surgical Prods. Ltd., 64 F. Supp. 2d
448, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting that "most of the cases applying [the Zippo] framework have
looked to specific jurisdiction," but nonetheless applying Zippo to a question of general
jurisdiction).
160. See Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296-97 (10th Cir.
1999); Nationwide Contractor, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 296; 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. Memorial Eye, No.
2:08-CV-983 TS, 2009 WL 1586654, at *2 (D. Utah June 4, 2009) Mueller v. Sunshine Rest.
Merger Sub LLC, No. 1:09-CV-0443, 2009 WL 1107263, at *3-4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2009).
161. See Dagesse v. Plant Hotel N.V., 113 F. Supp. 2d 211, 222 (D.N.H. 2000).
162. See Foley v. Yacht Mgmt. Group, Inc., No. 08 C 7254, 2009 WL 2020776, at *3, n.1
(N.D. Il. July 9, 2009); Roblor Mktg. Group, Inc. v. GPS Indus., Inc., No. 08-21496-CIV, 2009
WL 2003156, at *8-9 (S.D. Fla. July 6, 2009); Howard v. Mo. Bone & Joint Ctr., Inc., 869
N.E.2d 207, 212 (Il1. App. Ct. 2007); Holland v. Hurley, No. 2 CA-CV 2008-0126, 2009 WL
1383809, at *5-6 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 19, 2009) (finding the Zippo analysis inappropriate where
"the defendant does not own or control the website); see also Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research
Prods., 346 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813 (D. Md. 2004) ("Website interactivity is important only insofar
as it reflects commercial activity, and then only insofar as that commercial activity demonstrates
purposeful targeting of residents of the forum state or purposeful availment of the benefits or
privileges of the forum state."); Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 297 F. Supp. 2d
1154, 1160 (W.D. Wisc. 2004) (noting that a passive website may be sufficient for personal
jurisdiction if it is used to intentionally harm the plaintiff in the forum state and an interactive
website may be insufficient if it is not directed at the residents of the forum state, demonstrating
how "a rigid adherence to the Zippo test is likely to lead to erroneous results.").
163. Rather than being its own subcategory, internet use is simply a middle layer or filter
between a defendant's activities and their effects in the forum. So while a traditional libel case
would analyze the effects of a publication on an in-state plaintiff as well as the circulation within
the state, doing business there, so too should an intentional tort case arising out of internet use be
analyzed: by looking at the effects of the actions on in-state persons, and how much business is
done in the state. Similarly, a products liability case does not cease to be determined by stream-of-
commerce principals simply because the product was purchased over the Internet. See Hy Cite,
297 F. Supp 2d at 1160 ("[Rlegardless how interactive a website is, it cannot form the basis for
personal jurisdiction unless a nexus exists between the website and the cause of action or unless
the contacts .. . are so substantial they may be considered 'systematic and continuous' for the
purpose of general jurisdiction."); Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet, supra note 43, at 97-99.
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their interpretation of what makes a website interactive." 6
The Zippo test (or at least courts' embrace of it) is also criticized
for functioning as an alternative to existing Supreme Court precedent. 165
Finally, a further concern involves the courts having latched on to a
single test-Zippo-for application to Internet contacts without noting
that Zippo itself was confined to specific jurisdiction in a commercial
context. 166
D. Positive Trends: Application of Traditional Personal-Jurisdiction
Concepts to Internet Cases and the Concept of Targeting
There have been two positive trends away from the one-size-fits-all
Zippo interactivity test. The first is toward a more traditional analysis of
internet contacts that does less harm to the logic of the Supreme Court's
precedents-a movement advocated by many scholars. 167 Courts are
increasingly treating internet contacts more like ordinary contacts, and
the Zippo test is finding less favor. 168
164. Compare Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 44 (D. Mass. 1997)
(finding interactivity based on a website's encouragement and enabling of users to email the
company) with Butler v. Beer Across Am., 83 F. Supp.2d 1261, 1266 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (finding
insufficient interactivity in a website through which the plaintiffs son placed an order for the
purchase of an alcoholic beverage).
165. See Hy Cite, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 1160 ("[T]he [Supreme] Court 'long ago rejected the
notion that personal jurisdiction might turn on 'mechanical' tests.... [S]pecialized tests are often
'doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles.' ") (internal citations omitted).
166. Yokoyama, supra note 119, at 1167 ("[E]ven though the Zippo test arose from a
trademark dispute and the jurisdictional issue was squarely centered on specific jurisdiction,
courts soon adopted and applied the Zippo test in substantively divergent cases, as well as
applying the test to general jurisdiction issues. The result has been the inappropriate
transformation of the Zippo test into an all-purpose test for Internet jurisdiction issues.") (internal
citations omitted).
167. See Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet, supra note 43, at 104 (advocating traditional
analysis); Steuer, supra note 121, at 355 (explaining that "[t]here is nothing problematic about
continuing to use the traditional analysis to determine jurisdiction based on Internet contacts.");
Allan R. Stein, The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 32 lrqr'L LAW, 1167,
1173 (1998) ("[I]n spite of all its space-defying qualities, claims arising on the Internet are
susceptible to a fairly coherent resolution under existing jurisdictional doctrine."); TiTi Nguyen, A
Survey of Personal Jurisdiction Based on Internet Activity: A Return to Tradition, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 519, 530 (2004) (arguing that "by modifying the Zippo sliding scale or utilizing the
Calder effects test, [some] courts have unwittingly returned to the traditional personal jurisdiction
test.").
168. See Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 101l, 1016-18 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying traditional
minimum contacts test to decline jurisdiction over eBay seller); Precision Craft Log Structures,
Inc. v. Cabin Kit Co., Inc., No. CV05-199-S-EJL, 2006 WL 538819, at *6 (D. Id. Mar. 3, 2006)
(applying traditional jurisdiction principles rather than interactivity to find specific jurisdiction in
copyright infringement case); Dagesse v. Plant Hotel N.V., 113 F. Supp. 211, 223 (D.N.H. 2000)
("[A] proper analysis of the jurisdictional effects of an internet web site must focus on whether the
defendant has actually and deliberately used its web site to conduct commercial transactions or
other activities with residents of the forum."); Roblor Mktg. Group, Inc., v. GPS Indus., Inc., No.
08-21496-CIV, 2009 WL 2003156, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 6, 2009) ("We share in the criticism of
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Second, as pointed out above, 169 many courts have added a "target-
ing" element to their use of the Zippo test,1 70 a move that has also been
advocated by scholars. 17t The targeting concept has roots in the Calder
"effects" test and in the Asahi plurality opinion' 72 but primarily relates
to the requirement of purposeful availment that is the touchstone of
traditional minimum contacts analysis.' 73 Targeting has been advocated
as a means of focusing on a defendant's actions-those directed toward
a particular jurisdiction, rather than actions directed at all jurisdictions
simultaneously-as well as a means of focusing on actions that the
over-reliance on the sliding scale of interactivity analysis."); Foley v. Yacht Mgmt. Group, Inc.,
No. 08 C 7254, 2009 WL 2020776, at *3 n.1 (N.D. I11. July 9, 2009) ("This Court agrees that the
Zippo test is not particularly helpful and thus should not be applied in the context of a public
internet auction site. As such, the Court will apply a traditional analysis focusing on purposeful
availment of a forum."); Pres-Kap, Inc. v. Sys. One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351-52 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (applying traditional analysis to decline its exercise of personal
jurisdiction); GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1349-50 (D.C. Cir.
2003) ("Access to a website reflects nothing more than a telephone call by a District resident to
the defendants' computer servers, all of which apparently are operated outside of the District.").
169. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
170. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000)
(finding that the "express aiming" required by the Supreme Court "is satisfied when the defendant
is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows
to be a resident of the forum state"); Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334
F.3d 390, 400 (4th Cir. 2003) (requiring "something more than merely plac[ing] information on
the Internet" for jurisdiction based on Internet contacts); Am. Info. Corp. v. Am. Infometrics, Inc.,
139 F. Supp. 2d 696, 700 (D. Md. 2001) (finding the exercise personal jurisdiction based on web
site existence inappropriate where site "does not target Maryland in any way").
171. Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1380-1404 (2001) (advocating the use of three
criteria to assess whether a website has targeted a particular jurisdiction: contracts, technology,
and actual or implied knowledge); Scott T. Jansen, Comment, Oh What a Tangled Web ... The
Continuing Evolution of Personal Jurisdiction Derived From Internet-Based Contacts, 71 Mo. L.
REv. 177, 199-202 (2006) (discussing alternative tests); Brian D. Boone, Comment, Bullseye!:
Why a "Targeting" Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in the E-Commerce Context Makes Sense
Internationally, 20 EMORY Ir4T'L L. REV. 241, 288 (2006) ("For businesses engaged in E-
commerce, widespread adoption of a targeting approach would alleviate much of the opportunity
for unreasonable litigation because business owners could limit the geographic areas they target
for business, regardless of whether they are technically 'successful' at keeping users from certain
locales off their site. For the typical Internet plaintiff, such a targeting requirement would spell the
end of lawsuits in the plaintiffs forum state when all that was accessed in the state was a website
not intending to do business in that state. Such a result would be encouraging to E-commerce
innovation and expansion.").
172. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) ("The 'substantial
connection' between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum
contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
State.") (citations omitted); see Boone, supra note 171, at 252 ("[I]t is Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion, though criticized by Justice Stevens in a separate concurrence, which adopted a
targeting approach to stream-of-commerce cases.") (footnote omitted).
173. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) ("[A] forum legitimately
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who 'purposefully directs' his activities
toward forum residents.") (citation omitted).
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defendant should reasonably expect to result in his or her being haled
into the forum state. 174
Despite these positive trends, the state of the case law remains in
hopeless confusion. If anything, courts are even more confused about the
applicable standards. In a recent case in the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania, 75 a court applied three different tests to determine whether the
plaintiffs had made a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction based on
antitrust and consumer-protection claims:
Three alternative theories allow a court to acquire specific jurisdic-
tion over a defendant. First, under principles of purposeful availment,
the court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant that has directed
its activities into a forum, thereby producing the alleged injury. Sec-
ond, the stream-of-commerce theory provides jurisdiction over an
out-of-forum defendant if plaintiffs in-forum injury arises from a
product that defendant placed into channels of commerce. Third, the
effects test announced in Calder v. Jones confers jurisdiction over a
defendant whose tortious conduct performed outside the forum pro-
duced effects within the forum. 17 6
The court separately addressed each such basis for specific jurisdic-
tion, as well as the plaintiffs argument for general jurisdiction, finding
none of them sufficient as applied to the foreign defendants. Finally, the
court addressed whether those defendants could be subject to "alter ego
jurisdiction" based in part on the existence of websites suggesting that
the foreign and domestic companies operated as "integrated conglomer-
ates with a single identity." 177 The suggestion of jurisdiction based tan-
gentially on the existence of a website prompted the court to apply yet
another test of personal jurisdiction: Zippo interactivity.1 78 Despite the
fact that the plaintiffs argument was apparently based on the websites
only to the extent that those sites revealed evidence of alter ego status,
the court analyzed the sites' interactivity and whether they were directed
at the forum. 179
Thus despite some positive trends, the application of the Supreme
174. In addition, commentators have advocated the use of "targeting" in an international
context as a step toward global minimum legal standards for the exercise of jurisdiction in the e-
commerce context. Geist, supra note 171, at 1382; Boone, supra note 171, at 287-88.
175. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 602 F. Supp. 2d 538, 557 (M.D. Pa. 2009).
176. Id. (internal citations omitted).
177. Id. at 570.
178. Id. at 570-71 n. 35 ("A website may support exercise of jurisdiction if the defendant
'intentionally interacts with the forum... via the web site.") (quoting Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step
Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003), and Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 1119, 1126 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
179. Id. (finding the sites "properly considered as a contact for purposes of general
jurisdiction" but because they lack "a particularized intent to conduct business with American
residents," they would receive little weight).
[Vol. 64:133
THE SHORT ARM OF THE LAW
Court's personal-jurisdiction precedents-particularly to online activi-
ties-is as confused as ever.
IV. MODERN PERSONAL-JURISDICTION LAW Is A DRAIN ON
FEDERAL AND STATE COURT SYSTEMS
The existence of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defend-
ants-individual or corporation, large or small, foreign or domestic-
remains a constant unknown. 180 And, the issue is litigated more than
ever.' 8 ' In a search of cases considering motions to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, citations on Westlaw rose from 534 in 1988 to 740
in 1998, to 1767 in 2008.182 International Shoe has been cited by courts
over 14,000 times. The use of the Internet will only increase the number
of cross-state contacts in the future, promising more such judicial
labor. 183
There is evidence that this jurisdictional uncertainty inhibits
180. See David S. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Personal
Jurisdiction, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1987) (discussing the complaint of a federal district court
judge that lawyers are unable to answer clients' questions about personal jurisdiction with
certainty); Casad, supra note 106, at 1589-90 (calling Supreme Court decisions "far from
satisfactory," "[lacking] a coherent philosophical foundation," and noting "[i]t is not surprising
that cases presenting the issue of amenability to personal jurisdiction under these confusing
standards now make up a large share of reported state and federal decisions"); id. at 1593
("Because outcomes are often difficult to predict, parties are inclined to litigate the question of
personal jurisdiction in every case where the issue is not crystal clear. Hence, we get more and
more conflicting decisions."); Cameron & Johnson, supra note 14, at 833 ("Unfortunately,
uncertainty in the most commonplace situations has increased, rather than decreased, as
International Shoe has matured.").
181. See Casad, supra note 106, at 1591 ("We are bound to continue expending countless
hours of attorney time litigating whether a defendant has contacts with the forum state sufficient to
satisfy International Shoe and its progeny.").
182. Using the search terms "dismiss s 'personal jurisdiction"' and the database "allcases," I
found the following number of citations for the following years:
1988: 534 1995: 691 2002: 947 2009 (as of 8/7/09):
1989: 559 1996: 775 2003: 999 1058
1990: 663 1997: 739 2004: 989
1991: 671 1998: 741 2005: 1336
1992: 662 1999: 793 2006: 1676
1993: 628 2000: 818 2007: 1758
1994: 708 2001: 867 2008: 1767
While some of this increase is attributable to the increase in availability of decisions on Westlaw, I
believe it clearly reflects an increase in the number of such motions, particularly in the last five
years. This list also includes appellate decisions, but an increase in appeals also reflects uncer-
tainty in the law.
183. See ABA GLOBAL CYBERSPACE JURISDICTION PROJECT, ACHIEVING LEGAL AND BUSINESS
ORDER IN CYBERSPACE: A REPORT ON GLOBAL JURISDICTION IssuEs CREATED BY THE INTERNET 6
(London Meeting Draft 2000) ("The volume of cross-state contacts has increased and will
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internet commerce. 184 Research has suggested a positive correlation
between the outcome of personal-jurisdiction disputes and the outcome
on the merits,' 8 all the more reason to litigate the issue. 186 The jurisdic-
tion question ties up the systems of both state and federal courts, 87
causing litigants to incur time and expense in the fight over an issue
tangential to the merits.
V. SHORT-ARM STATUTES: A SOLUTION HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT
States have always had the ability to exercise less personal jurisdic-
tion than the Constitution would allow t88-and indeed, many states have
long-arm statutes that would seem to do just that, at least based on their
precise language.' 89 However, thirty-two states have long-arm statutes
that either explicitly, or by virtue of courts' interpretation of their legis-
continue to increase at a more rapid rate by virtue of the proliferation of electronic
communications and the use of the Intemet in commercial applications.").
184. MICHAEL GEIST, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Global Internet Jurisdiction: The
ABA/ICC Survey 1 (Apr. 2004), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/newsletter/OO23/materials/js.pdf
(finding by 2003 survey of companies worldwide that U.S. companies believed the internet
jurisdiction issue had become worse over the past two years and would continue to worsen, and
also finding that "the risk of getting hauled into court is the biggest fear of companies operating
online."); id. at 16 ("Thirty-seven percent of North American respondents said that online business
had become harder since 2001 and only six percent replied that it had become easier.").
185. Cameron & Johnson, supra note 14, at 780 (finding "a clear correlation [in the Supreme
Court's jurisdictional decisions following Internationall Shoe] between the party who prevailed
on jurisdiction and the victor on the merits.").
186. Id. at 837 ("If the party prevailing in a personal jurisdiction dispute (and thus on forum
choice) is more likely to prevail on the merits, defendants are more likely to contest jurisdiction
and plaintiffs are more likely to resist the challenge."); id. at 838 ("[T]he current doctrinal
uncertainty almost mandates competent attorneys to litigate the issue when a defendant is sued far
from home").
187. Id. at 835 ("State, as well as federal, courts have been forced to deal with the fallout.
Litigation over personal jurisdiction abounds in the bread-and-butter of state court dockets.").
188. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 450-51 (5th ed., West Publishing Co.
1994); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 440 (1952) ("The suggestion that
federal due process compels the State to open its courts to [any] case has no substance.").
189. Thirty states have "specific acts" or "enumerated acts" long-arm statutes that specify the
circumstances under which out-of-state defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the state.
See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits of
Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REv. 491, 525 (2004). However, twelve of those states have interpreted
their statutes to extend to the limit of due process. Id. at 526-27. That leaves only eighteen states
that exercise less than the full amount allowed by the Constitution. Id. at 525-26 (listing
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin as the short-arm states). But see 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1068 n.12 (3d ed. 1998) (stating that Oklahoma and
Wyoming have been interpreted not to reach the limits of the Constitution, but that Georgia,
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri and West Virginia have all interpreted their long-arm statutes to
assert maximum jurisdiction). There is clearly some confusion in the area of state long-arm
practice.
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lature's intent, extend to the limits of due process. 190 So in many
instances, rather than simplifying the process, the application of the
long-arm statute is an utterly pointless exercise in fitting facts within
statutory parameters before tossing that statute aside and getting to the
constitutional analysis.' 9 1
Instead, states should reevaluate their long-arm statutes to provide
for less conferral of personal jurisdiction than the Constitution allows
and to assert jurisdiction in more specific circumstances in which those
states have a legitimate interest.' 92 While this will not eliminate the con-
stitutional issue, which will arise in any event when a court decides that
jurisdiction exists, it will result in more certainty.' 93 And most impor-
tantly, it ties together the Supreme Court precedent expressing deference
to state interests and states' articulation of those interests. 194 If the state
expresses a legitimate interest in exercising jurisdiction in certain cir-
cumstances, the Court will in turn give deference to that expression. 95
State long-arm statutes could be crafted in a way that manifests the
190. But see McFarland, supra note 189, at 511-24 (suggesting that long-arm statutes have
been improperly construed to extend to due process limits).
191. In one recent case that clearly pushed statutory construction to the side, the court agreed
with the parties that the facts of the case did not fall within Kentucky's long-arm statute, but
nonetheless analyzed the question of personal jurisdiction under constitutional standards. Doe v.
Al Maktoum, No. 07-293-KSF, 2008 WL 4965169, at *2-3 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 18, 2008) ("[E]ven if
a defendant's conduct does not fit within one of the clauses of Kentucky's long-arm statute, a
court may still exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident if the defendant's contacts with
Kentucky are sufficient under Constitutional due process standards."). Id. at *3. Even when the
statute is clearly meant to extend to due process, problems arise. See WRIGHT & MILLER, § 1068,
supra note 189 (3d ed. 1998) (Stating that a long-arm statute that explicitly goes to the extent of
due process "suffers from vagueness, encourages litigation over jurisdiction questions, and tends
to convert every jurisdictional issue into a dispute with constitutional dimensions.").
192. See infra APPENDIX.
193. See David S. Welkowitz, Going to the Limits of Due Process: Myth, Mystery and
Meaning, 28 DuQ. L. REV. 233, 269 (1990) (describing certainty and fewer appeals as benefits of
adopting a categorical or enumerated acts long-arm statute).
194. This solution advances both the state sovereignty and due process bases for jurisdiction
advanced by scholars. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Shorter long-arm statutes further
the sovereignty basis for personal jurisdiction by reflecting states' own indication of what their
interests are. They further the due process concept because, by having such a statute with specific
bases for personal jurisdiction, defendants should foresee being haled into court in that forum if
they commit that activity and are purposefully availing themselves of the benefits of that state's
laws if they do commit those acts. This solution also avoids the due process prohibition against
states' arbitrary assertions of jurisdiction by advocating arms that are shorter than what due
process will allow.
195. See Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, supra note 41, at 645 ("[T]he concept of
minimum contacts was originally intended to protect the notion that valid adjudicatory jurisdiction
is limited to those cases in which the defendant's contacts have implicated legitimate interests of
the state. That is, the minimum connection that must exist between a nonresident defendant and
the forum is one where the alleged actions of the defendant have implicated the legitimate
interests of the forum state, creating a link that makes it fair and nonarbitrary for that state to
exercise adjudicatory authority over the case against that defendant.").
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circumstances under which those states have a compelling interest in
exercising jurisdiction over both internet and noninternet activity.' 96
That activity then would constitute the contacts upon which personal
jurisdiction is based because defendants would be holding up their end
of the quid pro quo envisioned in Supreme Court precedent. Such
defendants would also be on notice in a much more specific way that
their activities may result in them being haled before a court of that
state.
An analogy can be made to service of process. While there is an
over-arching constitutional standard that tells us when notice is suffi-
cient, 1 individual states and the federal courts have rules that are well
within the Constitutional requirement and specify proper means of ser-
vice of process."' The issue of whether someone has been properly
served is thus a much more certain one. Venue is another example where
the Constitution would allow greater leeway than statutory requirements,
but the existence of specific rules results in greater certainty and less
litigation. 199
A. Legitimate State Interests
As set forth above, the Supreme Court has approved of states'
expression of their interests in exercising personal jurisdiction in
instances where citizens of the state have been harmed by intentional
actions of the defendant directed toward the state,2° ° where the claims
involved the maintenance of trusts established under the law of the
state201 or the activities of officers and directors of corporations estab-
lished under the law of the state,20 2 or in circumstances where "defend-
ants 'purposefully derived benefit[s]' from their interstate activities. 20 3
Similarly, many existing state long-arm statutes provide for jurisdiction
196. The model statute separately addresses when internet business is deemed to be conducted
within the state. Other internet activity, like communication or tortious activity, would be
analyzed like non-internet activity. See infra APPENDIX.
197. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1941) (stating that the form of service must be
"reasonably calculated to give [the defendant] actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity
to be heard."); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1950)
(explaining that the Constitution requires defendants be "accord[ed] full opportunity to appear and
be heard.").
198. See FED. R. Crv. P 4.
199. See Cameron & Johnson, supra note 14, at 841.
200. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985).
201. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254-55 (1958).
202. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213-17 (1977).
203. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473-74 (citing Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 96
(1978)).
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in these circumstances.2 °4
Other examples in which states assert personal jurisdiction in
accordance with recognized interests include provisions for jurisdiction
over defendants who insure in-state people or property ;205 claims involv-
ing divorce or for alimony, paternity, child support, or custody;
20 6
claims arising out of mortgages or foreclosure actions; 20 7 and actions for
the collection of taxes. 20 8 North Carolina has even revised its long-arm
statute to specifically cover claims for injury where at or about the time
of the injury the defendant sent "unsolicited bulk commercial e-mail"
into the state.209
Other traditional state interests reflected in long-arm statutes
include jurisdiction over contracts to supply goods or services within the
state and jurisdiction where the cause of action is connected to real prop-
erty located within the state.210
States also express their lack of interest in hearing certain types of
cases. For example, some states limit the reach of their long-arm statutes
to cases brought by residents of the forum. 21' Many states choose not to
assert long-arm jurisdiction over defamation cases.212 In some states, the
204. The model statute provides for jurisdiction over defendants who act intentionally and
harm a person or property within the state where the defendant derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce. See infra APPENDIX.
205. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104(c)(6) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(l)(d) (West
2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634-35 (a)(4) (West 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-514(d) (West
2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A; § 3(f) (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.705(4) (West 2009); Mo. ANN. STAT.. § 506.500.1(5) (West 2009); MONT. R.Civ.P.
4B(1)(d) (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16(A)(4) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-
75.4(10) (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382(A)(9) (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 56-3-33(a)(7) (West 2009); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(10) (West 2009).
206. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)(e), (h) (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN.§ 9-10-91(5) (West
2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 514(e), (f) (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3(g), (h)
(West 2009); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.705(7) (West 2009); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 506.500.1(6), 2 (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-16(A)(5) (West 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
302(b) (McKinney 2009).
207. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-75.4(6)(d) (West 2009); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(7)
(West 2009).
208. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-75.4(9) (West 2009); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(9) (West
2009).
209. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-75.4(4)(c) (West 2009).
210. See Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, supra note 41, at 649-50.
211. See WRGr & MILLER, § 1068, supra note 189 (describing long-arm statutes in
Mississippi, Utah, Wisconsin, and Massachusetts).
212. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b(a)(2) (West 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2)
(McKinney 2009). But see Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Shiv K. Kapoor, Extraterritorial Personal
Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century: A Case Study Reconceptualizing the Typical Long-Arm
Statute to Codify and Refine International Shoe After Its First Sixty Years, 3 SETON HALL Cm.
REV. 339, 377 (2007) (stating that Georgia's long-arm statute includes a defamation exclusion that
"is out of date, based on a Fifth Circuit line of cases in the 1960s decided prior to the enactment of
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long-arm statute only applies to corporate defendants' 1 3 or to associa-
tions and partnerships. 214 In addition, states may decide to limit the
reach of their jurisdictional arms in cases involving commercial claims
as opposed to tortious injury. t
These existing expressions of state interests should be followed as
written, rather than being construed to the extent of the Constitution and
should be narrowed even further to increase certainty. For example,
where the state wishes to exercise jurisdiction over defendants who
intentionally harm citizens via activity directed toward the state, the stat-
ute could specify what is meant by "directed" activity.2" 6
B. Specification in Traditional Contexts
In addition to these already-existing expressions of state interest,
states should more clearly specify the circumstances under which indi-
viduals and corporations are subject to jurisdiction under their long-arm
statutes in the broader contexts discussed under the Supreme Court
precedents-contracts, stream of commerce, and intentional torts. For
example, existing categorical long-arm statutes often provide for juris-
diction over a defendant who "transacts business" in the state.21 7 The
statutes could define the transaction of business to include more substan-
tial contacts than the Constitution would require-perhaps by reference
to a minimum dollar amount of business done in a specified period218 or
a minimum percentage of the defendant's business being done in the
state.219 While these figures and criteria may become dated, the legisla-
the long-arm, which held that First Amendment concerns required greater showing of contacts to
satisfy due process in defamation cases against nonresidents.").
213. See WRIGHT & MILLER, § 1068, supra note 189 (citing to TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-223
(West 2009) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 913(b) (2009)).
214. See id. (citing to TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-223 (West 2009)).
215. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) (referring to states'
"manifest interest" in providing a forum for redressing injuries inflicted on their residents);
Wruo & MILLER, § 1068, supra note 189 (noting the original nonresident motorist statutes
paved the way for statutes asserting personal jurisdiction based on a variety of hazardous
activities).
216. The model statute attempts to do this in the context of internet activity. See infra
APPENDIX.
217. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3104(c)(1) (2009) ("Transacts any business or
performs any character of work or service in the State"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)(a) (West
2009) ("Operating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this
state..."); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91(1) (West 2009) ("Transacts any business within this state");
HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 634-35(a)(1) (West 2009) ("The transaction of any business within this
State"); MD CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRoc. § 6-103(b)(1) (LexisNexis 2009) ("Transacts any
business or performs any character of work or service in the State").
218. See Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455-57 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(upholding jurisdiction over nonresident who contracted with New York corporation, generating
more than $17,000 in income for the defendant).
219. See Bassili v. Chu, 242 F. Supp. 2d 223, 229-30 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (upholding jurisdiction
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tion can be changed. 220 The requirement of more substantial business to
be done by the defendant in the forum state is itself an expression of the
state's legitimate interest in exercising jurisdiction only over defendants
who seek and receive substantial benefits from the forum's laws.22'
C. The Internet Context: A Definition of Virtual Availment
The internet field is one particularly ripe for states to weigh in on.
In addition to judicial efficiency, state legislatures should consider eco-
nomic interests: if their state is considered hostile to web commerce,
website operators may use technology to avoid doing business in that
state.222 Alternatively, states may encourage web commerce by limiting
jurisdiction over defendants based on website operations alone to spe-
cific circumstances.223
As discussed above, internet activity is most often relied upon for a
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction in cases based on (i) web com-
merce; (ii) intentional torts such as online defamation; and (iii) trade-
mark and copyright infringement. States could revise their long-arm
statutes to better define the circumstances under which internet activity
gives rise to jurisdiction in those contexts.
(i) Web Commerce. Similar to the suggestion above in other busi-
ness contexts, state long-arm statutes could limit the finding that a
defendant is "doing business" via a website as the sole basis for jurisdic-
tion to situations where the defendant performs a specified minimum
amount of business in the state (either in dollar or percentage terms), and
over nonresident defendant who did business in state of 3.5% and 2.5% of total sales in the last
two years, amounting to $30,000).
220. The minimum amount in controversy necessary for diversity jurisdiction is an example of
legislation changing with time and inflation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 cmt. (2005) (the statute was
amended from requiring $3,000 to $10,000 in 1958; to $50,000 in 1988; to $75,000 in 1996)
221. It may also benefit the states themselves economically. See McFarland, supra note 189, at
533 (noting that one advantage of enumerated acts statutes is that they may promote the state's
economy by encouraging economic activity by nonresident businesses who perceive themselves as
having greater freedom there).
222. See Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L. REV. 323, 334 (2003) (discussing geographic
identification on the internet); Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U.
PA. L. REV. 1951, 1961-62 (2005) (explaining how technological innovations allow website
filtering to avoid purposeful availment).
223. See Burk, supra note 127, at 60-61. (Concluding that broad amenability based on
internet contacts "may very well raise the price of participation beyond the average citizen's
reach.... The average user simply cannot afford the cost of defending multiple suits in multiple
jurisdictions, or of complying with the regulatory requirements of every jurisdiction she might
electronically touch."); ELECTRONIC COMMERCE PROJECT'S AD Hoc TASK FORCE, ICC, POLICY
STATEMENT: JURISDICTION AND APPLICABLE LAW IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, available at http://
www.iccwbo.org/id478/index.html (2001) (describing the negative result of jurisdictional
ambiguity).
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the cause of action arises out of that website business.224 In addition,
states could statutorily affirm sites' "jurisdictional avoidance" efforts.225
(ii) Intentional Torts. States could better define the type of target-
ing activity that they envision giving rise to liability. This could take the
form of a mens rea requirement-that the defendant knew the target of
the defamation was located in or would feel the effects in the forum
state, for example-or a quantity calculation where a single such
targeted statement would be insufficient, but numerous efforts to target
forum residents would suffice.
(iii) Trademark and Copyright Infringement. As with the inten-
tional torts discussed above, states could distinguish between mere neg-
ligent infringement that lacks intent to harm anyone in the forum and
intentional infringement targeted at the forum.226 States could also make
the decision that they are more concerned with infringement of websites
that are interactive, as in Zippo itself, and build that into the long-arm
statute: a defendant would subject himself to personal jurisdiction in the
forum state based on a claim for trademark infringement if the allegedly
infringing website is both interactive and targeted at the forum.
D. The Model Short-Arm Statute
Attached as "APPENDIX" is a model statute, primarily drafted based
on New York's long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R § 302, with additional
restrictions borrowed from section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes, and
additional suggested restrictions on internet-based contacts. Aside from
the internet context, states should be encouraged to consider other sub-
stantive types of claims for which they wish to extend or contract their
jurisdictional reach. For example, the model statute does not carve out
224. States could choose to assert jurisdiction over cases in which the internet business done
by the defendant is also the type of business which affects traditional local state interests, as in
Illinois v. Hemi Group, LLC, No. 08-3050, 2008 WL 4545349, at *4 (C.D. I11. Oct. 10, 2008)
(upholding jurisdiction based on only six sales to in-state residents over a two-year period, but the
sales implicated the state's health and welfare interest).
225. See Geist, Is There a There?, supra note 171, at 1393-98 (describing "technologies that
provide businesses with the ability to reduce their legal risk by targeting their online presence to
particular geographic constituencies."); Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet:
Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 411, 451-52
(2004) (discussing technological means by which website operators can avoid entering into
business with certain jurisdictions); see also Model Short-Arm Statute, APPENDIX.
226. Compare Andy's Music, Inc. v. Andy's Music, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1284 (S.D.
Ala. 2009) (refusing to apply Calder effects test to allegations of negligent trademark
infringement) with Toytrackerz LLC v. Koehler, No. 08-2297-GLR, 2009 WL 1505705, at *11
(D. Kan. May 28, 2009) (applying Calder to allegations of continuing engagement in trademark
infringement, "after receiving notice of Toytrackerz' claims to the trademarks," as well as
defamation).
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actions for defamation, 227 and it does not specifically provide for juris-
diction over actions based on loans made in the state.22 8 It also does not
specify a minimum dollar or percentage for "doing business," instead
following the example of states that require "substantial revenue" from
in-state activity where the defendant commits a tort outside the state.
Where the model statute is most innovative is in its treatment of
business conducted via the Internet. The model statute provides:
Internet Business. Business is deemed to be transacted within the
state when that business is conducted via website activity that is
targeted at the state or at a person within the state, and results in a
purchase or sale being made or service being provided by or to an in-
state resident.2 29 "Targeting" means commercial activity specifically
directed to the forum state, including, for example, designing the
website for the market in the state, advertising in the state, or know-
ing and continuous sales made or services provided to in-state
residents.
Jurisdictional Avoidance. A website's use of procedures that are
reasonably designed to guard against business in the forum is prima
facie evidence that the website is not "targeted" at the forum. 230
This allows jurisdiction where activity is directed toward a forum,
and avoids the nebulous interactivity inquiry, increasing the foreseeabil-
ity of being haled into court in that forum and fulfilling the quid pro quo
envisioned by Supreme Court precedent. The model also allows website
operators who use technological means to avoid doing business in a
jurisdiction to get the benefit of that effort: there is a presumption that
such a website is not targeted at the forum, although that presumption
could be overcome by contrary evidence.
The statute would provide for jurisdiction in situations like that of
Zippo itself, where Pennsylvania residents were subscribers to the defen-
dant's website service (thus services were provided to instate residents
227. New York's long-arm statute does make an exception for defamation cases. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) (McKinney 2009). It was also recently amended to provide for jurisdiction
over defendants in a declaratory judgment attacking liability based on foreign defamation
proceedings; the "Libel Terrorism Protection Act" passed in the wake of Ehrenfeld v. Bin
Mahfouz, 881 N.E. 2d 830, 833-36 (N.Y. 2007). See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, Supplementary
Practice Commentary by Vincent C. Alexander (McKinney 2008).
228. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-75.4(6)(d) (West 2009).
229. See infra APPENDIX.
230. This language is based on the Securities and Exchange Act opinion as to when an offshore
issue comes under its regulation. Among the factors the Commission stated it would consider in
determining whether the United States was de-targeted on the internet were "whether the website
offeror implements procedures that are reasonably designed to guard against sales to U.S. persons
in the offshore offering." Boone, supra note 171, at 272 (quoting the Statement of the
Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer Securities Offshore, Securities Act
Release No. 7516 (Mar. 23, 1998)).
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in the language of the model statute), and the defendant entered into
contracts with Internet service providers in Pennsylvania (thus constitut-
ing "targeting").
Internet domain-name suits could also fall within section (a)3 of the
Model Statute for commission of tortious acts outside the state having
effects within the state.23' If the defendant's actions were intentional, the
lesser showing of 3(ii) would apply-"derives substantial revenue from
interstate or international commerce. 232 Otherwise, the defendant must
derive substantial revenue from in-state activity.
An example where jurisdiction would not be found under the model
statute is that presented by the recent case of Sayeedi v. Walser,2 33 where
the New York purchaser of an item on e-Bay sued the seller for breach
of contract.2 34 Because the seller, a casual user of the eBay system, did
not target New York-instead he presented the item as open to any and
all bidders, who themselves would dictate the shipping location 235-he
would not have done "business" in the forum under section (b) of the
model statute.
Other internet activity, including electronic communication or tor-
tious activity like defamation, would be treated like noninternet activity
under this model. Of course, online defamation would likely fall within
the intentional tort category of 3(ii) with its broader revenue require-
ment. Alternatively, the online defamer may be deemed to be doing bus-
iness within the state under (a)(1) (and doing business is further defined
in the internet context). The intentional defamation could be deemed
"targeted at the state or a person within the state," and the defendant's
internet activity must also have resulted in a purchase or sale or service
provided by or to an in-state resident.
E. Arguments Against the Short-Arm Solution
Following are some potential arguments against the solution that
states modify their long-arm statutes to provide for personal jurisdiction
in well-defined circumstances that fall well within due process limits.
1. Inconvenience to plaintiffs. There will be some plaintiffs who
are unable to sue in the forum of their choice. But states should be
encouraged to make a judgment call as to the circumstances in which
they believe convenience to plaintiffs is outweighed by the benefits of
231. See infra APPENDIX.
232. Id.
233. 835 N.Y.S.2d 840, 843-44 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2007) (finding no personal jurisdiction based
on New York's long-arm statute).
234. Id. at 841.
235. Id. at 843.
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certainty and predictability. These circumstances will not include those
causes of action that the states feel have a strongly local flavor. And all
long-arm statutes could include a provision for allowing the exercise of
personal jurisdiction to the constitutional limit where no other jurisdic-
tion would be available to the plaintiff (i.e., where the defendant is
foreign).236
2. Litigation will not really be reduced. Some say there is no less
litigation with specific act statutes because the court nonetheless must
address the constitutional issue. This ignores three points: First, if there
is more certainty as to what circumstances give rise to personal jurisdic-
tion, fewer plaintiffs will bring suit against defendants in unlikely fora,
and fewer defendants will challenge jurisdiction when the circumstances
fall within the specified limits. Moreover, if jurisdiction is not within the
state's long-arm, there is no need (and in fact no basis) to consider the
constitutional issue.2 37 Finally, if jurisdiction falls within a shorter state
long-arm statute, the constitutional question should be a relatively easy
one.
238
3. Technology changes will make statutes obsolete. The broader
Constitutional tests like that set forth in International Shoe have the vir-
tue of being flexible and adaptable to changes in technology, while spe-
cific statutes may not. But this problem is not new and has not been
intractable 9.2 3  State long-arm statutes have been revised frequently,
including revisions to include jurisdiction over senders of "[u]nsolicited
bulk commercial" e-mail24 0and to cover claims involving the operation
of computers and computer programs.2 4 1
4. States will not voluntarily contract their jurisdiction, but
instead are prone to expand their sovereignty and overreach. This argu-
ment is belied by the fact that at least some states already exercise less
than the full extent of personal jurisdiction they are allowed.242 In addi-
236. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2) would already allow this in federal court based on a federal claim.
237. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 189 ("[I]f there is no basis in state law for exercising
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a federal court sitting in diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction need not-and, indeed, should not-consider the constitutional due process
question.").
238. The cases are rare in which the exercise of jurisdiction is found to comply with a truly
limited categorical long-arm statute but nonetheless is found to violate due process. See Ganiko v.
Ganiko, 826 So.2d 391, 394-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Taurus Textiles, Inc. v. John M.
Fulmer Co., 372 S.E.2d 735, 737-38 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988). Under the short-arm approach, the
result would be rarer still.
239. Service of process rules have also been revised to keep up with technological advances.
See W. VA. CODE AN. § 56-3-33(c) (West 2009) (allowing service by electronic means).
240. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-75.4(4)(c) (West 2009).
241. Cor. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b(a)(5) (West 2009); MD CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 6-103(c)(2) (LexisNexis 2009).
242. And the process in which other states decided to extend their jurisdiction reach is murky.
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tion, if legislators performed a cost-benefit analysis that takes into
account the price that is paid for jurisdictional uncertainty that only
increases litigation and expense, they might find a limitation on the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction to be welcome.243 Instead of valuing juris-
diction for its own sake, states should consider what types of cases truly
matter to them and to their citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION
The increase in certainty provided by shorter long-arm statutes will
benefit potential defendants who will not be sued in the fora for which
jurisdiction would have been a stretch under the Constitution. It will
benefit potential plaintiffs who will know where they can obtain per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant and who will be able to move for-
ward with the substance of their claims rather than being distracted by
the inevitable jurisdictional side-show. And it will benefit the courts
whose resources will be better spent in this manner than in repeating
verbatim the jurisdictional dictates of the Supreme Court and parsing
their import in the application to yet another fact pattern.
See McFarland, supra note 189, at 541 ("Court extension of enumerated-acts long-arm statutes to
the limits of due process did not occur by considered precedent or reasoned analysis. Instead, it
happened via bald assertion, assumption, mistake, and inadvertence.").
243. See Borchers, supra note 81, at 103-04 ('There is every reason to be optimistic ... that
with the matter placed back in the legislative arena, states will draft sensible and clear long-arm
statutes.").
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THE SHORT ARM OF THE LAW
APPENDIX
Model Short-Arm Statute244
Personal Jurisdiction By Acts of Non-Domiciliaries
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to a cause of
action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domicili-
ary, or his executor or administrator, who in person or through
an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts any-
where to supply goods or services in the state; or
2. conmmits a tortious act within the state; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to
person or property within the state, if he
i. regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any
other persistent course of conduct, or derives substan-
tial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in the state, or
ii. expects or should reasonably expect the act to have
consequences in the state and derives substantial reve-
nue from interstate or international commerce; or
4. owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within
the state; or
5. contracts to insure or act as surety for, or on, any person,
property, risk contract, obligation or agreement located or
to be performed within the state at the time the contract is
made, unless the parties otherwise provide in writing.
Internet Business. Business is deemed to be transacted within
the state when that business is conducted via website activity
that is targeted at the state or at a person within the state, and
results in a purchase or sale being made or service being pro-
vided by or to an in-state resident. "Targeting" means commer-
cial activity specifically directed to the forum state, including,
for example, designing the website for the market in the state,
advertising in the state, or knowing and continuous sales made
or services provided to in-state residents.
Jurisdictional Avoidance. A website's use of procedures that
are reasonably designed to guard against business in the forum
is prima facie evidence that the website is not "targeted" at the
forum.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant in matrimonial
244. This statute is modeled on New York's long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302
(McKinney's 2008), with additional restrictions borrowed from section 48.193, Florida Statutes
(1995), and suggested restrictions on internet-based contacts. It should not be construed as going
to the extent of due process.
2009l
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
actions or family court proceedings. A court in any matrimonial
action or family court proceeding involving a demand for support,
alimony, maintenance, distributive awards or special relief in matri-
monial actions may exercise personal jurisdiction over the respon-
dent or defendant notwithstanding the fact that he or she no longer is
a resident or domiciliary of this state, or over his or her executor or
administrator, if he or she no longer is a resident or domiciliary of
this state, or over his or her executor or administrator, if the party
seeking support is a resident of or domiciled in this state at the time
such demand is made, provided that this state was the matrimonial
domicile of the parties before their separation, or the defendant aban-
doned the plaintiff in this state, or the claim for support, alimony,
maintenance, distributive awards or special relief in matrimonial
actions accrued under the laws of this state or under an agreement
executed in this state.
(c) Effect of appearance. Where personal jurisdiction is based solely
upon this section, an appearance does not confer such jurisdiction
with respect to causes of action not arising from an act enumerated in
this section.
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